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1. Introduction1  
 
1. The Secretariat’s proposal for a Unified Approach under Pillar One 
represents an important starting point for a multilateral consensus 
among the members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS.  
 
2. From a policy perspective, the proposal seeks to allocate additional fiscal 
revenues to market countries. In order to achieve this objective, the 
proposal entails a significant departure – specifically as regards Amount 
A – from the consensus around the separate entity and arm’s length 
principles reaffirmed again by the 2017 OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines2. 
 
3. It is not the purpose of the present submission to assess this policy shift. 
Similarly, the present submission does not generally discuss possible 
interactions (or implementation issues) of the Secretariat’s proposal 
with international law, including European Union law.  Rather, in line with 
the consultation document, our comments are exclusively intended to 
contribute to the elaboration of a “Unified Approach” that is as much as 
possible principles based and pursues the path of achieving simplicity 
and legal certainty with a view to minimize disputes3. We generally 
 
1       The authors are grateful to the members of the research team of the Tax Policy 
Center of the University of Lausanne dedicated to Pillar One and Two, in particular to 
Mr. Lionel Reboh and Mr. Benjamin Malek for their help in selecting the various 
sources relating to the preparation of this submission.   
2  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations 2017, para. 1.14: «OECD member countries reiterate their support 
for the consensus on the use of the arm's length principle that has emerged over the 
years among member and non-member countries and agree that the theoretical 
alternative to the arm's length principle represented by global formulary 
apportionment should be rejected». 
3  These concerns have already been echoed in our previous submissions Comments on 
Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy – Public 
Consultation Document, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 
Publishing, February 2019)  available on 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/hou6dvuckmahoft/OECD-Comments-Received-Digital-
March-2019.zip?dl=0 
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welcome the fact that the Secretariat’s proposal for a Unified Approach4 
is fully aware of these important challenges.  
 
4. Our submission is structured in seven main sections. We begin with 
Scope and Nexus (sections 2 and 3). Next, we turn to profit allocation 
and successively discuss Amount A (4), Amount B (5) and Amount C 
(6). Finally, we briefly discuss some implementation issues relating to 
Amounts A, B and C.  
 
2. Scope  
 
2.1. Application to consumer / user facing businesses   
 
5. Although not explicitly stated, out of the three proposals that were 
presented earlier this year5, from a conceptual perspective the Unified 
Approach seems to be built on the market related intangibles idea. That 
latter proposal was premised on the policy rationale that a traditional or 
digital MNE (or business) can be actively present in a Market Country on 
a remote basis (for instance, digitally) or through a local presence to 
develop existing or new market related intangibles such as brands, trade 
names, customer data, customer lists, and customer relationships6. The 
market related intangibles proposal essentially argued that, if a non-
resident supplier actively intervenes in a Market Country through its own 
efforts and develops market related intangibles therein, then the latter 
State should have a right to tax the profits (at least a part of it) linked 
to the intangibles. This proposal is justified by the fact that an intrinsic 
functional link exists between the marketing intangibles and the market 
 
4 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing, October 2019).  
5 Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy – Public 
Consultation Document, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 
Publishing, February 2019).   
6 OECD, supra n. 5, at para. 30.   
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jurisdiction7.  
 
6. From an intrinsic link perspective, some scholars have argued that the 
use of IP (and profits associated with it) could be ‘sourced’ to the 
Country whose laws provide legal protection for that property8. In 
particular, it has been argued that ‘marketing intangibles like trademark 
and goodwill … are inherently connected to the sales market’, especially, 
sales made in a business to consumer context9. Other commentators 
share a similar opinion and state that, under existing principles, ‘a strong 
argument can be made that the jurisdiction where the base of customers 
or a network exists is a natural source for goodwill and customer-based 
intangibles’10. If this line of reasoning is correct, the question arises as 
to why Amount A of the Unified Approach would only apply to consumer 
facing and user facing businesses (the latter are prominently Highly 
Digitalized Businesses)11?  In our view, a possible justification is that the 
intrinsic functional link is stronger in consumer / user facing businesses 
as opposed to non-consumer (user) facing businesses.  We believe 
however that it would be desirable to further substantiate this limitation 
to consumer facing and user facing businesses. More important and 
discussed below is obviously the definition of “consumer / user facing” 
which needs to be clarified.  
 
7. Assuming that a Market country could be justified to exercise its taxing 
 
7 OECD, supra n. 5, at paras. 31-32. 
8 L. Lokken, The Sources of Income From International Uses and Dispositions of 
Intellectual Property, 36 Tax Law Rev. 233, 242 (1981); M.A. Kane, A Defense of 
Source Rules in International Taxation, 32 Yale J. on Regulation 311, 341-342 
(2015); R. Vann, Reflections on Business Profits and the Arm’s-Length Principle, in 
The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties, 145-146 (B. J. Arnold, J. 
Sasseville & E. M. Zolt eds, Canadian Tax Foundation, 2003). 
9  R.Vann, Taxing International Business Income: Hard Boiled Wonderland and the End 
of the World, 2 WTJ 3, p. 337 (2010) Journals IBFD.  
10 P. Oosterhuis & A. Parsons, Destination Based Income Taxation: Neither Principled 
Nor Practical?, 71 Tax Law Rev. 515, 522-524 (2018). V. Chand, Allocation of taxing 
rights in the Digitalized Economy: Assessment of potential policy solutions and 
recommendation for a Simplified Profit Split Method?, 47 (12) Intertax, 2019, section 
5.3. 
11 OECD, supra n.5, at para. 19.  
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right over the profits linked to these intangibles, the profits that could 
be taxed by this country should not be excessive and should remain in 
proportion to the ‘benefits’ provided by that State. In other words, an 
excessive re-allocation of profits to the Market countries should not be 
made under Amount A. This is because the production countries also 
need to be compensated for generating profits12. Naturally, as the 
Market countries would be allowed to tax a part of the profits linked to 
market related intangibles, the starting point for an allocation under 
Amount A needs to be built mainly around sales (turnover) made in a 
market and, depending on the business model, the presence of users in 
a jurisdiction.  
 
8. Further, it should be noted that any solution that targets consumer / 
user facing businesses should be built on well-established tax policy 
principles such as those agreed in the context of the ‘Ottawa’ 
Framework13. For instance, any solution should be as neutral14 as 
possible in the sense that it should apply to all consumer / user facing 
businesses unless certain exceptions can be justified. Second, as echoed 
previously, a solution should pursue the path of certainty and simplicity, 
especially, with respect to profit allocation15. Third, a solution should be 
efficient in that the compliance costs should be low for both tax 
administrations and taxpayers16. Fourth, the solution should be effective 
in the sense that taxes can be easily collected by the tax administration 
and fair so that opportunities for tax avoidance are minimized17.  
 
 
12 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 57.  
13 OECD, Electronic Commerce: Taxation Framework Conditions, Report by the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs (OECD Publishing, 1998), at para. 9 (Box 2); Also see 
OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 - 2015 Final 
Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (OECD Publishing, Oct. 
2015), paras. 10-13.  
14 OECD, Electronic Commerce, supra n. 13, at para. 9 (i).  
15 OECD, Electronic Commerce, supra n. 13, at para. 9 (iii).  
16 OECD, Electronic Commerce, supra n. 13, at para. 9 (ii).  
17 OECD, Electronic Commerce, supra n. 13, at para. 9 (iv). 
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2.2. Illustrative list of businesses that could be possibly carved in  
 
9. In this section, we provide our comments separately for consumer facing 
and user facing businesses.  
 
10. Turning first to consumer facing businesses, it should be noted that a 
business should be carved in to the extent it’s focal point is to create a 
brand or trade name that resonates in the minds of potential individual 
consumers18. Moreover, seen from the perspective of the business, the 
objective of the enterprise should to create a final product / or provide 
a service for an individual consumer. In this sense, a difference should 
not be made as to whether the product / service is sold in a business to 
consumer (B2C) or Business to Business (B2B) context. The controlling 
criteria is – for whom does the business develop the product / service? 
If the business makes the product / service primarily for consumption 
by an individual, then it should be carved in. For example, a MNE, which 
is in the business of making branded chocolates should be carved in. It 
should not matter whether the MNE sells branded chocolates directly to 
an individual (through its own store) or to another business that gives 
it to its employees for consumption. By contrast, businesses that do not 
create products or provide services targeted at consumers should not 
be carved in. This said, it remains challenging to develop a definition of 
what constitutes a consumer facing business. Ideally, a reference needs 
to be made towards certain international benchmarks / information 
available in the public domain to understand what constitutes a 
consumer facing business.  
 
11. With respect to defining consumer facing businesses (consumers being 
individuals)19, one possibility would be to refer to certain international 
benchmarks such as the Industrial Classification Benchmark20 or Global 
 
18 OECD, supra n. 5, at para. 31.  
19 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 19 (and footnote 7).  
20  Available on https://research.ftserussell.com/products/downloads/ICB_Rules.pdf  
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Industry Standard Classification21 benchmark or other benchmarks22. 
Based on these benchmarks, the following businesses may fall within 
the scope of this proposal (non-exhaustive list).  
 
• Consumer Goods Business such as: 
− food & beverages business (examples – food products, soft drinks, 
alcoholic beverages);  
− personal goods business (examples – luxury goods, fashionable 
goods, consumer electronics, hygiene / health care goods, 
tobacco); 
− household goods business (examples, household furnishing 
products or household appliances or cleaning products);  
− automobiles and automobile component businesses (examples – 
cars, motorcycles, bikes);  
− pharmaceutical business (examples – medicines that are made for 
individual consumption); 
− businesses whose core business is wholesaling or retailing goods 
(foods, drugs, clothes etc) can also fall within this category.   
 
• Consumer Services Business such as:  
− media business (examples – broadcasting through television or 
radio, publishing, entertainment business such as motion 
pictures);   
− travel and leisure businesses (examples – passenger airlines or 
cruises) or brick and mortar business that sell travel or leisure 
packages; 
− telecommunication businesses (examples – mobile phone 
operators),  
 
21  Available on https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/documents/112727-
gics-mapbook_2018_v3_letter_digitalspreads.pdf  
22 For example, see International Standard of Industrial Classification available on 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesm/seriesm_4rev4e.pdf. Also see, 
Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community available 
on https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:Statistical_classification_of_economic_activities_in_t
he_European_Community_(NACE) 
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− financial services (examples – consumer finance services such as 
credit cards, private banking, private insurance or investment 
advisory services) and so on.  
 
• Franchising businesses that are often seen in either consumer goods 
or consumer services space such as:  
− businesses that franchise fast food restaurant concepts;  
− businesses that franchise fashion concepts;  
− businesses that franchise hotel concepts.  
 
12. With respect to user facing businesses, sufficient work has already been 
done with respect to highly digitalized businesses (HDBs) by policy 
making organisations / tax administrations23. For instance, businesses 
that develop a large user base for monetization purposes include, for 
example, businesses engaged in social media platforms, search engines 
and online market places24. One the other hand, it seems that other 
HDBs such as online content providers (online streaming of music and 
videos) and E-retailers (that purchase products for reselling) and so on 
have been classified as businesses in which user participation is less 
relevant25. Nevertheless, it seems that these HDBs can be classified as 
consumer facing businesses. 
2.3. Illustrative list of businesses that could be possibly carved out  
 
13. If the proposal applies to consumer / user facing businesses, then 
certain businesses will need to be carved out. Once again, a reference 
 
23 OECD, supra n. 5, at para. 19; European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive 
on the Common System of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the 
Provision of Certain Digital Services, COM(2018) 148 final, 2018/0073(CNS), (21 
Mar. 2018); Also see Central Board of Direct Taxes, Income department – 
Government of India, Proposal for Amendment of Rules for Profit Attribution to 
Permanent Establishment (CBDT, 2019); UK: HM Treasury, Corporate tax and the 
Digital Economy: Position Paper Update (2018).   
24 European Commission, supra n. 23, at pp. 7-9; Central Board of Direct Taxes, supra 
n. 23, para. 175; UK: HM Treasury, supra n. 23, Para 2.45 (2018).     
25 Central Board of Direct Taxes, supra n. 23, para. 175; UK: HM Treasury, supra n. 23,  
Para 2.45 (2018).   
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could be made to certain international benchmarks (listed previously) to 
design the scope of the carve out. Possible exclusions could include for 
instance (non-exhaustive list):  
− businesses engaged in the extractive sector such as businesses 
engaged in mining (examples – metals, minerals, coal and so on) 
or businesses engaged in extraction of petroleum and natural 
gas26.  
− businesses that sell materials that are used in other businesses 
(examples – commodities, chemical material, construction 
material, forest products like paper etc);  
− business that operate in the capital goods space (business that 
develop equipment that are used by other businesses);  
− businesses that operate in the industrial sector; 
− businesses that provide business to business consulting services; 
− businesses that provide financial services to other businesses 
(business to business lending or business to business advisory 
services).  
2.4. Special considerations for certain businesses  
 
14. Special attention should be given to some businesses that could be 
considered to be consumer or user facing as special rules apply to them 
under the current framework.  
 
15. The first example relates to shipping and airlines businesses. Cross 
border taxation of such businesses is covered under Article 8 OECD 
 
26 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 20; OECD, supra n. 5, at 
para. 71. Another reason could be used to justify the carve out for these kinds of 
businesses. For instance, when a non-resident extractive business operates in 
another State, that business will typically trigger a permanent establishment therein 
under Article 5. For example, Article 5(2)(f) provides that a PE includes a ‘mine, an 
oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural resources’. 
Moreover, see A. Auerbach, M. Devereux, M. Keen & J. Vella, Destination-Based Cash 
Flow Taxation, Saïd Business School Working Paper 2017/09 (2017), pp. 37-38. 
These authors also argue that the extractive industry should be carved out from the 
scope of their proposal because the State in which a product is extracted always has 
the right to tax the profits derived from the extraction of the product (national 
resources and immovable property).   
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MC27. The Article provides that, in many situations, the profits of such 
businesses are taxed in one State alone28. That country could be the 
State where the enterprise has its place of effective management or its 
place of residence. In other words, other countries in which the 
consumers reside (which could be market countries) are not allowed to 
tax such profits. The main policy reasons for adopting this approach 
relates to either preventing over taxation of such enterprises or practical 
difficulties that could arise with respect to determination and allocation 
of taxable profit to market countries29. Thus, such businesses could be 
carved out from the scope of the proposal (Amount A) as under the 
current framework they are not taxed in the market countries even if 
they operate with physical presence in those States. Moreover, from a 
practical standpoint, it would be extremely difficult to pin down the 
location of sales of such businesses (see section 4.4).   
 
16. A second example pertains to consumer financial services. In many 
situations, businesses such as banks30 and insurance31 companies 
operate with substantial presence in the market countries (branches or 
subsidiaries) and carry out core commercial activities therein. This is 
mainly because of local market regulations. Moreover, some financial 
services businesses, when they operate on a cross border basis could be 
subject to high withholding taxes on a gross basis. For instance, banks, 
which are engaged in providing cross border loans, could be subject to 
high withholding taxes on under Article 11 OECD MC 32. Similarly, widely 
 
27 See Art. 8 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017). 
28 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 8, para. 1 
29 UN Model Tax Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 8, paras. 2-3. Also see 
Maisto, Guglielmo. "The history of article 8 of the OECD model treaty on taxation of 
shipping and air transport." Intertax 31.6 (2003): 232-244. 
30 See: OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments 
(OECD Publishing, 2010), Part II, para. 4.   
31 See: OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments 
(OECD Publishing, 2010), Part IV, para. 2.   
32 See Art. 11 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017). See also OECD Model Tax 
Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 11, para. 7.7. and Danon, Robert. 
“Interest (Article 11 OECD Model Convention”, in Lang M. (ed.) Source Versus 
Residence: Problems Arising from the Allocation of Taxing Rights in Tax Treaty Law 
and Possible Alternatives, 2008, p. 81 et seq.   
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held investment funds or other funds (such as private equity funds) that 
invest in other countries (equity or debt instruments) could be subject 
to high withholding taxes under Article 10 OECD MC or Article 11 OECD 
MC. Moreover, if the investment is targeted at real estate (through real 
estate investment funds) then the State of situs of the property has a 
right to tax the income generated by that property, either under Article 
6 OECD MC or Article 13 OECD MC33. Thus, further analysis would be 
required to ascertain whether such businesses should be carved out 
from the scope of the proposal (Amount A) as under the current 
framework they either operate with presence in market countries or they 
may be subject to high market country taxation on a gross basis.      
 
17. Special attention should also be given to some other businesses that 
intuitively cannot be considered to be consumer or user facing.  
  
18. The first example relates to oil and gas MNEs. This industry is usually 
divided into upstream, midstream and downstream businesses34. 
Arguably, some parts of downstream businesses are consumer facing 
(for example, selling petrol through petrol pumps to ultimate 
consumers). Thus, further consideration should be given to whether 
such businesses are to be carved in or carved out.  
 
19. The second example relates to HDBs that could derive significant 
revenues from selling primarily in the B2B space, for instance, cloud 
computing businesses. Arguably, such businesses are not user facing or 
user participation by individuals plays a limited role in them35. Thus, 
further consideration should be given to whether such HDBs are to be 
 
 
33 See Art. 6(1) OECD Model Tax Convention (2017); Also see Art. 13(1) and 13(4) 
OECD Model Tax Convention (2017). 
34 See UN, Taxation of the Extractive Industries by Developing Countries, pp. 11-16.  
35 OECD, Tax Challenges Arising From Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS, , OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 
Publishing, 2018), para. 157; Central Board of Direct Taxes, supra n. 23, para. 175; 
UK: HM Treasury, supra n. 23, Para 2.47-2.48 (2018).  
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carved in? In this regard, it should be noted that such businesses (along 
with other HDBs) were within the scope of the EU Directive on Significant 
Digital Presence36.  
 
20. Moreover, special attention should also be given to branded businesses 
that sell branded products to other businesses, which in turn use them 
for their own goods. For example, a branded tyre manufacturer (MNE 
M) could sell tyres to a branded car manufacturer (MNE W). MNE W 
installs those tyres in its cars and sells them to individual consumers. 
While MNE W will be within the scope of the proposal, the question arises 
as to whether MNE M will fall within the scope of this proposal. Arguably, 
they should as they can be classified under the automobile components 
business. However, further consideration should be given to these type 
of businesses as they represent border line cases.     
  
2.5. Further criteria to carve out MNEs: MNE Turnover thresholds   
 
21. At the outset, it is desirable that the new rules should apply only to in 
scope MNE Groups that exceed a certain consolidated revenue 
threshold. From an efficiency perspective (compliance costs) this would 
make sense. The consultation draft indicates that the threshold could be 
Euro 750 Million37 which is similar to the threshold set in the Country by 
Country Reporting (CBCR) standard38. This threshold, although used in 
a different context, is also found in proposals with respect to digital 
service taxes (or DSTs) proposed either by policy making organisations 
(EU39 or OECD40) or national governments of some countries such as 
 
36  See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating 
to the Corporate Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, (21 Mar. 2018), pp. 1-19.   
37 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 20.  
38 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 
- 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 
Publishing, Oct. 2015). 
39 European Commission, supra n. 23.       
40 OECD, Interim Report, supra n. 35, para. 454.       
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Austria41, Spain42, France43, Italy44 and New Zealand45. Also, the UK46 
uses a comparable threshold of GBP 500 Million. While we welcome the 
use of a high threshold, further clarification should be provided as to 
why a threshold of Euro 750 Million is considered to be appropriate.  
 
22. Moreover, if a profit allocation solution (see section 4) is built on the 
basis of a MNE Business Line approach then a relevant MNE Business 
Line Turnover Threshold should also be built in the potential solution. 
From an efficiency perspective, this threshold also needs to be high in 
order to ensure that small revenue generating business lines of a MNE 
are carved out from the scope of the proposal.   
3. Nexus 
 
3.1. New Distributive Rule vs amending the Permanent 
Establishment (PE) Definition  
 
23. As a starting point, we agree that a new nexus should not be built into 
the PE definition but should rather be structured as an independent 
distributive rule47 as both authors of this submission have already 
argued previously48. We agree with this approach as it avoids 
 
41 Austria: Digitalsteuergesetz 2020 (132/ME), Art. 1, para 2.  
42 Spain: Proyecto de Ley del Impuesto sobre Determinados Servicios Digitales, Art. 8.    
43 France: LOI n° 2019-759 du 24 juillet 2019 portant création d'une taxe sur les 
services numériques et modification de la trajectoire de baisse de l'impôt sur les 
sociétés, ad Art. 299, §III.   
44 Italy: Bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l’anno finanziario 2019 e bilancio 
pluriennale per il triennio 2019-2021, n. 36, p. 8.     
45 NZ: New Zealand Government, Options for Taxing the Digital Economy – a 
Government Discussion Document, (June 2019).      
46 UK: Draft Legislation on the New Digital Services Tax, p. 4.  
47 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 22. 
48  R. Danon, Can Tax Treaty Policy Save Us? The Case of the Digital Economy, in Arnold 
B (ed), Tax Treaties After the BEPS Project: A Tribute to Jacques Sasseville, Canadian 
Tax Foundation, 2018, p. 75 et seq; V. Chand, supra n. 10, section 6.2 and L. Spinosa 
& V. Chand, A Long-Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models: Should the 
Permanent Establishment Definition be Modified to resolve the Issue or Should the 
Focus be on a Shared Taxing Rights Mechanism?, 46 (6/7) Intertax 476 (2018). 
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unnecessary spill over effects that could arise with other existing treaty 
distributive rules that use the PE concept, for example, the PE concept 
used in Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 21 and 24 OECD MC. Moreover, 
frictions could arise with existing profit attribution rules contained in 
Article 7 OECD MC49.   
3.2. MNE Group vs separate entity approach   
 
24. If a profit allocation solution for Amount A (see section 4) is built on a 
MNE basis then the nexus rule should, naturally, also be built on a MNE 
Group basis. The objective would be to ascertain the entire MNE Groups 
involvement in a market jurisdiction. Accordingly, the initial question 
that would arise is how you define a MNE Group for the purpose of this 
proposal.  
 
25. A first possibility would be to refer to various accounting standards to 
derive a definition. One possible approach to derive a definition involves 
referring to consolidated financial statements that have been prepared 
in accordance with the rules mandated by the jurisdiction of the Ultimate 
Parent Company of the MNE Group50. These statements, which could be 
based on local GAAP or International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS)51 could be considered as a starting point for the analysis (in 
particular, IFRS 1052).   
 
 
26. A second option would be to refer to the concept of associated 
enterprises under Article 9 OECD MC53.   
 
49 See L. Spinosa & V. Chand, supra n. 48..  
50 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 53.   
51 OECD/G20, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial 
Payments, Action 4: 2015 Final Report (OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project, 2015), Para. 121-126.  
52 See https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ifrs/ifrs10  
53 See Art. 9(1) OECD Model Tax Convention (2017). This Article provides that ‘two 
enterprises are associated if one of the enterprises participates directly or indirectly 
in the management, control, or capital of the other or if “the same persons participate 
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27. Another option would be to resort to Article 5(8) OECD MC54 which deals 
with the concept of closely related enterprises55.  
 
28. A common feature of the aforementioned provisions / guidance is their 
reference to control (either direct or indirect or through common 
control). Accordingly, by referring to the aforementioned provisions, in 
particular, the concept of ‘control’ the definition of a MNE Group could 
be developed. 
 
3.3. Quantitative vs qualitative thresholds  
 
29. Several scholars, even prior to the BEPS project, have supported using 
local market turnover thresholds to develop a new nexus56. Such a 
quantitative threshold, in addition to the MNE Group Revenue threshold, 
is also found in proposals with respect to DSTs57 proposed either by 
 
directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital” of both enterprises (i.e. 
if both enterprises are under common control)’. 
54 See Art. 5(8) OECD Model Tax Convention (2017). 
55  The Article states ‘For the purposes of this Article, a person or enterprise is closely 
related to an enterprise if, based on all the relevant facts and circumstances, one has 
control of the other or both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises. 
In any case, a person or enterprise shall be considered to be closely related to an 
enterprise if one possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the 
beneficial interest in the other (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 per cent 
of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity 
interest in the company) or if another person or enterprise possesses directly or 
indirectly more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest (or, in the case of a 
company, more than 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s 
shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) in the person and the 
enterprise or in the two enterprises’. 
56 For instance, see B. Arnold, Threshold Requirements for Taxing Business Profits 
under Tax Treaties, 57 Bull. Int’l Tax’n 10, 476-492 (2003); A.J. Cockfield, Balancing 
National Interests in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce Business Profits, 74 Tulane 
Law Review 133, 198-206 (1999); R. Avi-Yonah, & O. Halabi, A Model Treaty for the 
Age of BEPS, Law & Economics Working Papers, Paper 103, 15 (2014); R. Avi-Yonah, 
Designing a 21st century Taxing Threshold: Some International implications of South 
Dakota vs. Wayfair, Public law and Legal Theory research paper no. 611 (2018).     
57 OECD, Interim Report, supra n. 35, para. 455.       
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policy making organisations such as the EU (Euro 50 Million)58 or 
national governments of some countries such as UK59 (GBP 25 Million), 
Austria (Euro 25 Million)60, Spain (Euro 3 Million)61, France (Euro 25 
Million) 62, Italy (Euro 5 Million)63 and New-Zealand64 ($3.5 Million). We 
agree with the approach that nexus rules should predominantly be based 
on sales linked to a market or in the context of certain HDBs, users in a 
market65.  
 
30. It would be conceivable to combine the sales threshold with other 
qualitative factors. This latter approach would however need to be 
balanced with the need to achieve legal certainty, simplicity and prevent 
disputes. For instance, qualitative factors were considered in the context 
of the SEP proposal66 such as user factors (for instance, collection of 
data from users), digital factors (for instance, maintaining a website in 
the local language and payment options in the local currency) or factors 
such as responsibility for the final delivery of goods to customers / the 
provision by the enterprise of other support services or sustained 
advertising, marketing and promotional activities. However, if a similar 
path were to be followed, it should be borne in mind that such factors 
could lead to rather subjective / imprecise outcomes which in turn could 
lead to differences in interpretation and, ultimately, disputes. 
 
 
58 European Commission, supra n. 23.       
59 UK: Draft Legislation on the New Digital Services Tax, p. 4.  
60 Austria: Digitalsteuergesetz 2020 (132/ME), Art. 1, para 2.  
61 Spain: Proyecto de Ley del Impuesto sobre Determinados Servicios Digitales, Art. 8.    
62 France: LOI n° 2019-759 du 24 juillet 2019 portant création d'une taxe sur les 
services numériques et modification de la trajectoire de baisse de l'impôt sur les 
sociétés, ad Art. 299, §III.   
63  Bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l’anno finanziario 2019 e bilancio pluriennale 
per il triennio 2019-2021, n. 36, p. 8   
64 NZ: New Zealand Government, Options for Taxing the Digital Economy – a 
Government Discussion Document, (June 2019).      
65  V. Chand, Allocation of Taxing Rights, supra n. 10, section 6.2. 
66 OECD, supra n. 5, at paras. 50-55. 
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3.4. Time or temporal requirements 
 
31. We also believe that the nexus rule will need a temporal requirement to 
be built into it to show ‘sustained and significant involvement’67 in the 
market jurisdiction.  This will also ensure that isolated / one-off 
transactions are not caught by this provision.  
 
32. One option to demonstrate this requirement is to resort to subjective 
factors found in the existing PE definition such as the degree of 
permanence requirement68. However, such a test could lead to tax 
uncertainty as the analysis will depend on the facts and circumstances 
of each taxpayer.  
 
33. An alternative approach could be contemplated which essentially states 
that the MNE will be considered to have a taxable nexus with a country 
if it exceeds the revenue thresholds in each year over the past three or 
five years. Another approach would be to resort to objective thresholds 
already discussed in the EU Commission draft proposal on a Significant 
Digital Presence69. For instance, number of contracts concluded with 
third parties in a particular country or the number of users in a particular 
jurisdiction in the context of certain HDBs. The foregoing two 
approaches could also be combined to develop a legal nexus test.  
 
 
3.5. Setting the local revenue threshold  
  
34. At the outset, the question arises as to whether the amount reflected in 
this threshold should be the sovereign choice of each State or should a 
threshold be suggested?  Our analysis of various DSTs (as discussed 
 
67 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 22.  
68 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 5, para. 28.  
69  See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive, supra n. 36, pp. 1 – 19.    
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above) indicates that countries contemplate different local revenue 
thresholds. Thus, we are inclined to say that each country should be free 
to set its own threshold. This said, we would like to highlight that a 
minimum threshold should also be proposed. If countries start adopting 
low threshold (for instance, INR 100,000 for the Indian equalization levy 
which is approximately USD 1,400)70 then the costs of compliance with 
respect to administering this proposal becomes high. Thus, a minimum 
revenue threshold, which is substantially high, needs to be proposed. 
This would imply that a country cannot go below the proposed minimum 
threshold.   
 
35. The minimum revenue threshold would also need to be expressed in a 
certain common currency. One possible option is to link it to a globally 
accepted currency, for instance, USD or Euro71. However, issues could 
then arise with respect to converting USD / Euro into local currencies. 
Another option, which is found in the context of Article 17 OECD MC72, 
is to refer to the IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR). That standard 
provides the possibility to avoid referring to any local currency. 
Moreover, as outlined in the BEPS Action 1 report, the threshold should 
be set taking into consideration the size of a countries market73 (for 
instance, by referring to the GDP of a country for a particular year or a 
combination of a few years). Another important issue pertains to 
determination of the Country in which the revenue arises for an in scope 
MNE (consumer or user country). This issue is discussed subsequently 
(see section 4.4).   
 
4. Profit Allocation: Amount A  
 
 
70 India: Finance Act 2016, Section 165, 2(b).  
71 European Commission, supra n. 23, Art. 4(2).        
72 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 17, para. 10.1.  
73 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, supra n. 13, at para. 
278.  
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4.1. Overview of the method  
 
4.1.1. Introductory comments  
 
36. In order to apply this method, this approach requires74:   
 
• Step 1: Identification of the total profits of the MNE Group Business 
Line, for example, the overall profit margin (Z%)75.  
 
• Step 2: Calculate deemed routine profits margin (X%). This margin 
will then be deducted from the overall profit margin in order to arrive 
at non-routine profit margin (Y%)76.  
 
• Step 3: The non-routine profit margin (Y%) will be split between a 
profit margin allocable to production activities such as trade 
intangibles (V%) and profit allocable to market related activities 
such as a market related margin (W%)77.  
 
• Step 4: The profit allocable to a market related margin (W%) will 
then be allocated to the Market Country on the basis of an allocation 
key such as sales78. 
 
4.1.2. Step 1: Calculation of MNE Group Profits or MNE Group Profit 
Margin  
 
37. At the outset, the question arises whether the proposal applies to the 
whole MNE group (if it has more than one business line) or the relevant 
 
74 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at paras. 51-61. 
75 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 53. 
76 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at paras. 54-56. 
77 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at paras. 57-59. 
78 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at paras. 60-61. 
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business line within a MNE79. Arguably, devising a potential solution with 
respect to a consolidated group (consolidated business lines) seems 
simpler and more predictable. However, such an approach may not 
provide accurate results as different businesses could be mixed with 
each other. Accordingly, a relevant MNE business line approach should 
be followed in order to have more accurate results80. However, if the 
levels of details that are required for applying this approach get 
extremely cumbersome then the consolidated business line approach 
should be considered (at least as a safe harbour for Amount A) 81.    
 
38. If a MNE Business Line approach is followed, an initial question that 
arises is what is a MNE Business Line? Some MNEs may operate with a 
centralized business line, that is, through a centralized entrepreneur in 
one country. Others may have decentralized business lines with local 
entrepreneurs in many countries. Some other MNEs may report a 
particular business line on a regional basis (USA, Europe, Asia Pacific 
and so on). Thus, it would be difficult to provide hard guidance with 
respect to the definition of a business line.  
 
39. Another issue pertains to the extent to which a MNE could go granular 
with respect to its business line information. Consider the following 
example:  
• Level A: If a MNE (X) is engaged in selling food products and 
automobiles then what are the business lines? In this situation, it is easy 
to state the MNE has two different businesses.  
 
• Level B: What happens if the food business of MNE X is divided between 
food for humans and food for pets. Will the pet food and human food 
constitute two different business lines or are they a part of the same 
business line?  
 
 
79  OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 32. 
80 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 30, para. 51, para. 53.  
81  V. Chand, Allocation of Taxing Rights, supra n. 10, section 6.3. 
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• Level C: Within the pet food business, food products could be developed 
for dogs and cats. Are the dog food or cat food business two different 
business lines or same business line?  
 
• Level D: Within the dog food business, the operating margins could be 
different for the USA market in comparison with the European market. 
In this regard, should the dog food business line be further segmented 
into a regional business line?  
 
40. The next issue relates to determination of consolidated profits (losses) 
of the MNE business line. As discussed previously, one could refer to 
consolidated financial statements that have been prepared in 
accordance with the rules mandated by the jurisdiction of the Ultimate 
Parent Company of the MNE Group82. These statements could be 
considered as a starting point for the analysis (local GAAP or IFRS)83. 
This said, although consolidated statements provide a good overview of 
the MNE, they may not contain detailed information about a MNE 
Business Line. Thus, this information needs to be gathered perhaps by 
looking into internal data such as managerial accounting records. 
However, the information from such records is less regulated than 
financial accounting information that is prepared for external 
stakeholders. Thus, the information obtained from such managerial 
records will need to be cross checked with the consolidated financial 
statements to ensure consistency with the numbers that are being 
reported. This said, we do acknowledge that it could be challenging to 
obtain MNE business line profit (loss) details. Specifically, issues could 
arise with respect to splitting common costs84.     
 
41. At this stage, we would like to state that further work needs to be done 
in this area of MNE Business Lines. One possibility that could be 
 
82 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 53.   
83 OECD/G20, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial 
Payments, Action 4: 2015 Final Report (OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project, 2015), Para. 121-126.  
84 UK: HM Treasury, Digital Services Tax Draft Guidance (2019), pp. 49-50.      
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considered to develop guidance on this matter is to resort to IFRS 8 
which deals with reporting operating segments85. Another possibility is 
to give the taxpayer the option to report MNE business line information 
which could then be audited by an independent auditor.    
 
42. Several questions also arise with respect to determining the overall 
profit (loss) margin as contemplated under this step.  
 
43. Firstly, should gross or net profits (operating profits) be considered? As 
the objective of the proposal is to allocate profits to market countries, 
we believe that net profit (or operating profit) information should be 
considered.  
 
44. Second, if net or operating profits, should these profits be based on an 
Earnings Before Taxation (EBT), Earning Before Interest and Taxation 
(EBIT) or Earning Before Interest Taxation Depreciation and 
Amortization (EBITDA) figures? In other words, what is the numerator 
for determining the overall profit margin? In this regard, it should be 
noted that in BEPS Action 4, it seems that the OECD gave a preference 
towards using EBITDA as it reflects an objective measure of economic 
activity86. Also, India in the context of discussing the fractional 
apportionment method showed a preference towards EBITDA87. On the 
other hand, EBIT figures are commonly used in a transfer pricing 
analysis88. While there are pros and cons towards using the foregoing 
two indicators, we believe that consideration should also be given to EBT 
as it is the most appropriate indicator to determine the true profitability 
of a business89. Of course, certain adjustments will be required for 
 
85 See https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ifrs/ifrs8. 
86 OECD/G20, Action 4: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 83, Para. 141.   
87  Central Board of Direct Taxes, supra n. 23, para. 159.  
88 To calculate net profits (although in a separate entity context), see OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017, paras. 
2.83 - 2.91 (with an emphasis on para. 2.86). The UK also seems to prefer using this 
indicator in order to determine the operating margin. See UK: HM Treasury, Digital 
Services Tax Draft Guidance (2019), pp. 47-48.    
89  V.Chand, Allocation of Taxing Rights, supra n. 10, section 6.3. 
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exceptional or extra ordinary income / expenses (for example, 
expenditure connected with acquisitions)90.  
 
 
45. Third, what should the numerator be weighed against in order to obtain 
a profit margin? As the objective of this new taxing right is to reallocate 
profits to the market jurisdiction on the basis on sales, an appropriate 
denominator would be sales of the relevant business line91. For the 
purpose of the rest of this document we will assume that EBT / Sales is 
used as a profitability indicator. 
 
4.1.3. Step 2: Calculation of Routine and Non Routine Operating Profit 
Margin  
 
46. Under this step, a certain percentage of the overall EBT margin of the 
MNE Group is deemed to be a routine return margin. For example, if a 
MNE Group has an overall EBT margin of 40% then a certain percentage 
(for example, 10% of that margin) will be considered to be a deemed 
routine EBT margin and the balance (30%) will be deemed to be non-
routine EBT margin. This would imply that if a MNE Group has an EBT 
margin less than 10% then it will fall outside the scope of this method. 
Consequently, no profits will be allocated under Amount A. If this is the 
situation, then the compliance requirements on the taxpayer should be 
relaxed (for instance, in determining nexus).   
 
4.1.4. Step 3: Splitting the Non-Routine Margin 
 
47. Continuing with the above, countries may agree upon a pre-determined 
split. For example, a 75%-25% split which divides the non-routine 
margin between production related activities (for instance, trade 
 
90 UK: HM Treasury, Digital Services Tax Draft Guidance (2019), p. 48.      
91 Also, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations 2017, paras. 2.96 - 2.97.   
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intangibles) and market related activities (for instance, marketing 
intangibles). For example, if a MNE Group has a non-routine EBT margin 
of 30% (as in this example) then 75% of that is allocated to production 
related activities whereas 25% is allocated to market related activities. 
This would imply that 7.25% of the overall EBT margin will be allocated 
to market related activities.  
 
4.1.5. Step 4: Allocation to Market (sales) countries  
 
48. Under this step, 7.25% of the MNEs business lines revenue will be 
considered to be allocable to the sales / market countries. The allocation 
can be made on the basis of sales made in the respective jurisdiction. A 
key question that arises is with respect to determination of the sales 
location. This is discussed later on in this submission (see section 4.4).  
 
4.1.6. High level illustration of this method92  
 
49. To understand the application of this approach, consider the following 
example. SF Group, which has its listed ultimate parent entity in Country 
R (Company R), sells branded product X in several countries (this is the 
only business). According to its consolidated financial statements for 
year 2021, SF Group has: (A) consolidated group operating revenue = 
$1 billion and (B) consolidated expenses = $600 million. Therefore, the 
Group profits (C) amount to $400 million. This amount (C) represents 
the Groups Earning Before Taxation. Let us assume that the Group 
generates ten percent of its global revenue from Country S ($100 
million) and twenty percent of its global revenue from Country S1 ($200 
million). Under the current transfer pricing rules, all of SF Group’s 
residual or non-routine profit is returned in Country R as the parent 
entity is the owner of the relevant trade and market related intangibles. 
 
92  For a similar example, see V. Chand, Allocation of Taxing Rights, supra n. 10, section 
6.3. 
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In order to allocate profits to Country S or Country S1, the method would 
apply as follows:  
 
50. Step 1: The Group EBT amounts to $400 Million and EBT margin 
amounts to 40% (EBT / operating revenues).  
 
51. Step 2: The deemed routine EBT margin is 10% and thus 30% will be 
deemed to be non-routine EBT margin.  
 
52. Step 3: The non-routine EBT margin of 30% is split between production 
activities (75%) and market activities (25%). Essentially, 7.25% of the 
EBT margin will be allocated to market related activities.  
 
53. Step 4: MS Group’s market related profits is determined to be 7.25% 
of the overall revenues, which amounts to $ 72.5 Million ($ 1 Billion 
*7.25%). The reallocation will work as follows. Country S: As ten 
percent of the global sales are derived from Country S it will be allocated 
USD $ 7.25 Million (72.5*100/1000 = 7.25) of that profit. Country S1: 
As twenty percent of the global sales are derived from Country S1 it will 
be allocated USD $ 14.5 Million (72.5*200/1000 = 14.5) of that profit. 
Country S and Country S1 will tax this profit at its ordinary corporate 
tax rate, regardless of whether the MNE Group has a physical presence 
in those countries. The question then arises as to which Country would 
alleviate double taxation. This is further discussed below.   
 
4.2. Elimination of double taxation: Surrender jurisdiction93   
 
54. The first issue pertains to identification of the relevant taxable person 
who would provide relief for the taxes paid in the market countries. As 
 
93  V. Chand, Allocation of Taxing Rights, supra n. 10, section 6.4. 
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the objective of Amount A is to reallocate a part of the residual profits 
to the market countries, we believe that the relevant taxpayer(s) that 
should provide relief is/are the entities in the MNE Group that book 
residual profits under the current transfer pricing rules. In the 
aforementioned example, the relevant taxpayer would be Company R in 
Country R.   
 
55. Of course, several issues arise when multiple entities within an MNE 
group can be considered to be the owner of non routine or deemed 
residual profits. For example, consider the situation of Company R in 
Country R that has developed all trade and marketing intangibles. 
Company R sells its products in the State R market. Further, for its 
overseas operations, Company R establishes a centralized business 
model (Company P – a principal entity) in Country P. Company P 
employs the intangibles for its operations and derives business income 
on a remote basis from several countries (including State S) and pays 
an arm’s length amount of royalties to Company R. If a tax liability arises 
in State S for the MNE Group under Amount A, then the question arises 
as to who is the taxpayer to whom the tax liability could be attributed, 
i.e., is it Company R (who is the owner of the intangible) or Company P 
(the taxpayer that has used the intangible)?94 In this case, both entities 
(who are characterized as entrepreneurs for transfer pricing purposes) 
could be identified as the relevant taxpayers. This would imply that both 
Country R (Company R) and Country P (Company P) could provide the 
relief. The relief could be divided in a predetermined proportion, for 
instance, based on the entities operating revenues. 
 
56. Consider another example of a decentralized MNE. MNE P, which is 
headquartered in Country S through Company P, owns all trade and 
marketing intangibles of the Group with respect to Product X. Company 
P sets up a licensed manufacturer is Country R (Company R) to which 
all intangibles are licenced. Company R makes and sells products in 
 
94 OECD, supra n. 5, at para. 83.    
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Country R. Company R pays an arm’s length royalty to Company P. If a 
tax liability arises for MNE P under Amount A then the relevant taxpayers 
will be both Company P and Company R. On a separate note, from a 
Country Rs perspective, there could also be an overlap between Amount 
A and Amount C (which is further discussed below in section 6).  
 
57. The next question pertains to which method should be used to alleviate 
double taxation. Currently, countries follow either the credit method or 
exemption method depending on whether they favour a policy based on 
capital-import or capital-export neutrality. Art. 23 A and B OECD MC 
mirrors this policy difference. On the other hand, to alleviate economic 
double taxation in a transfer pricing context, countries resort to tax base 
corrections, that is, corresponding adjustments95.  
 
58. At this stage, we believe that the manner in which double taxation is 
alleviated should remain the sovereign choice of each State.  
 
4.3. Dealing with losses   
 
59. Amount A should also consist of a mechanism which provides relief for 
losses96.  As a starting point, carry forward of losses for set off against 
future profits should be considered as opposed to a carry back system 
as the latter approach raises several administrative issues. Moreover, 
carry back systems could raise budgetary concerns for governments97. 
 
60. SF Group, which has its listed ultimate parent entity in Country R 
(Company R), sells branded product X in several countries (this is the 
only business). According to its consolidated financial statements for 
 
95 See Art. 9(2) OECD Model Tax Convention (2017). 
96  OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at para. 29, para. 37 & para. 51.  
97 See OECD, Corporate Loss Utilisation through Aggressive Tax Planning, (OECD 
Publishing, Aug. 2011); V.Chand, Allocation of Taxing Rights, supra n. 10, section 
6.3.   
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year 2020, SF Group has: (A) consolidated group operating revenue = 
$1 billion and (B) consolidated operating expenses = $1.2 billion. 
Therefore, the Group loss (C) amount to $200 million. This amount (C) 
represents the Groups Earning Before Taxation. In order to deal with 
losses, the method would apply as follows:  
 
61. Step 1: The Group EBT amounts to negative $200 Million and negative 
EBT margin amounts to approximately 20%.  
 
62. Step 2: The deemed routine EBT margin is 10%. This margin will equally 
apply to losses. This would imply that if a MNE Group has a negative 
EBT margin then this fixed deemed routine percentage will be added to 
the loss margin. This would amount to 20% + 10%  = 30% and it will 
represent the non-routine margin.  
 
63. Step 3: If the MNE has a non-routine margin of 30% (as in this 
example) then 75% of that is allocated to production related activities 
whereas 25% is allocated to market related activities. Essentially, 
7.25% of the overall loss margin will be allocated to market related 
activities.  
 
64. Step 4: SF Group’s market related loss is determined to be 7.25% of 
the overall revenues, which amounts to $ 72.5 Million ($ 1 Billion * 
7.25%). This loss will be carried forward for set off against profits for 
future years. Thereafter, the profit (after taking into consideration the 
losses) will be reallocated to the market jurisdiction. 
 
65. To illustrate, in year 2021 (see section 4.1.6), applying the four step 
approach will lead to the conclusion that the Market related intangibles 
profits amount to $ 72.5 Million. This amount will be reduced by the 
2020 loss of $72.5 Million thus amounting to a profit to be reallocated 
of zero.    
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66. The above example represents a situation wherein losses are earned 
within the Amount A regime. Special consideration should also be given 
to pre-existing losses that need to be brought into the Amount A regime 
i.e. before that regime becomes operational. For example, SF Group 
could be making losses at a consolidated level before entering into the 
Amount A regime such as in the past four years such as 2016 (50 
Million), 2017 (40 Million), 2018 (30 Million) and 2019 (20 Million). One 
possible simple approach, to deal with such losses is to simply state that 
the loss carry forward available to SF Group before entering into the 
regime amounts to the sum total of losses incurred in the past four 
years. This would amount to 140 Million. This loss amount can then be 
carried forward on an unlimited basis for set off against profits for future 
years. Thereafter, the profit (after taking into consideration the losses) 
will be reallocated to the market jurisdiction.  
 
4.4. Determination of location of sales (market countries) – A 
common issue with nexus  
 
 
4.4.1. Developing sourcing rules   
 
67. The new nexus as well as the new profit allocation rule (Amount A) 
require the determination of the Market Country to whom the taxing 
rights will be reallocated98.  
 
68. In order to determine this, one possible solution would be to refer to 
direct tax legislation / guidance of certain countries that allocate unitary 
corporate business profits based on several factors such as the United 
States. Historically, several US States have used the so-called 
"Massachusetts formula". That formula allocates the income of a Multi-
State corporation among US States by assigning equal weight to factors 
 
98  See I. Grinberg, Stabilizing “Pillar One”: Corporate Profit Reallocation in an Uncertain 
Environment, Georgetown University Working Paper, p. 41 (2019), retrievable on the 
SSRN Portal.  
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such as payroll, assets and sales99. However, several US States have 
moved away from a three-factor formula to a single factor formula, that 
is, sales100. Naturally, the question arises as to how do you determine 
the State of sales for a Multi-State corporation. In this regard, the Multi 
State Tax Commission101 has developed / proposed a common set of 
rules, in particular, with respect to the receipts (sales) factor. 
Specifically, rules have been put forward to determine the location of 
sales of tangible property102 and market-based sourcing rules have been 
developed with respect to transactions that deal with services and 
intangibles (including franchising). These rules determine the location of 
sales by using certain approximations103.  
 
69. Another possible solution would be to refer to VAT principles that use 
proxies to determine the jurisdiction in which the final consumption 
occurs104. VAT legislations contain place of supply or place of taxation 
rules for B2B or B2C transactions with respect to goods, services and 
intangibles. For instance, a reference could be made to the work already 
done by the OECD in the context of its International VAT / GST 
guidelines105.   
 
 
99  Similar but different system also exists in Canada, in particular, its provinces. See 
European Commission: Taxation Papers, Formulary Apportionment and Group 
Taxation In the European Union: Insights From the United States and Canada, 
Woking Paper No 8 / 2005, pp. 10-15. Also see R. Avi Yonah, K. Clausing & M.Durst, 
Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Profit 
Split, December 2008, Michigan Law Working Paper, pp. 54-55.  
100  See State Apportionment of Corporate Income available on  
https://www.taxadmin.org/assets/docs/Research/Rates/apport.pdf  
101 For instance, see Model General Allocation & Apportionment Regulations With 
Amendments Submitted for Adoption by the Commission February 24, 2017.   
102 Ibid, pp. 50 – 52.   
103 Ibid, pp. 52 - 100.    
104 See W. Hellerstein, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to the OECD’s International VAT/GST 
Guidelines, 18 FLA. Tax Rev. 589, 598 (2016).  
105 OECD, International VAT/GST Guidelines, (OECD Publishing, April 2017).   
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70. Moreover, for certain HDBs, a reference could be made to the work done 
by the European Commission106 or national governments (such as the 
UK)107 in the context of DSTs. 
 
71. Several commonalities emerge from the above. The first commonality 
pertains to the use of approximations or proxies to determine the 
location of sale. Second, the rules focus on the customer (user) or / and 
the use / consumption by that customer (user). It should be noted that 
use / consumption could have different meanings in different business 
models. Therefore, for the purpose of developing sourcing rules we 
suggest that proxies / approximations be considered which could range, 
for example, from the location of the purchaser (customer location) or 
the final place of use / consumption (consumer use or consumer 
consumption location)108.  
 
72. This being said, we would find it very important to conduct further 
research thereupon.  
 
4.4.2. Consumer product or consumer service businesses    
 
73. At the outset, if Amount A is based on a MNE business line approach 
then the focus should be placed on the core commercial activity of that 
business line. For example, if a MNE (headquartered in Country R) is in 
the business of making and selling branded chocolates then the focus 
should be on ascertaining the location in which the branded chocolates 
are sold to unrelated customers. Consequently, inter-company 
transactions among related entities will need to be looked through. 
 
 
106 European Commission, supra n. 23, Art. 5.   
107 UK: HM Treasury, Digital Services Tax Draft Guidance (2019).   
108 M. Devereux, R. Feria, Designing and Implementing a Destination Based Corporate 
Tax, Oxford University Center for Business Taxation, WP 14/07, (2014), pp. 14 – 18; 
A. Auerbach, M. Devereux, M. Keen & J. Vella, Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation, 
Saïd Business School Working Paper 2017/09 (2017), pp. 80 – 82; M. Devereux, A. 
Auerbach, M. Keen, P. Oosterhuis, W. Schön & J. Vella, Residual Profit Allocation by 
Income, Saïd Business School Working Paper 19/01, (2019), pp. 86-90.   
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74. With respect to determining the sales location, as a starting point, the 
location of the third-party unrelated purchaser (customer location) could 
be considered as a reasonable proxy. For instance, if Company R of State 
R, which belongs to a MNE R Group, sells goods / services / franchises 
to an unrelated business (A) or a private customer (Mrs B) in State S 
then the sales location is State S. This would be the case even if 
Company R sells to A or Mrs B through related parties.  
 
75. An issue could arise when A (who is in State S) purchases the goods / 
services from Company R for its various establishments, for instance, its 
PEs in Country S1, S2, S3 and so on. In this case, the question arises 
as to whether the consumption location proxy should be preferred over 
the customer location proxy? Ideally, this should be the case as a similar 
source rule is found in the context of Article 11(5) OECD MC109 
(expenses effectively connected to a PE). However, from MNE R Groups 
perspective (who will be subject to Amount A), this information could be 
difficult to ascertain. Thus, this is one area in which reasonable 
approximation rules / proxies will need to be developed.  
 
76. Also, in some situations (mostly B2B), the MNE R Group may wish to 
avoid taxes by taking advantage of the customer location proxy110. For 
example there could be situations where a MNE group engaged in selling 
products could engage in tax planning or tax avoidance strategies such 
as routing sales through an independent distributor which is established 
in a no tax or low tax jurisdiction. In such a case, a specific anti 
avoidance rule could be developed (SAAR). For instance, such a rule 
could deem the unrelated enterprise (the independent distributor) to be 
closely related if it substantially depends economically on the MNE. 
Further research needs to be done to understand such strategies.  
 
 
 
109 See Art. 11(5) OECD Model Tax Convention (2017). 
110 J.C Fleming, RJ. Peroni, S. Shay, Formulary Apportionment in the US International 
Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1 (2015), pp. 39-46 (2014).   
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4.4.3. Highly Digitalized businesses  
 
 
77. Special attention should be given to HDBs as the customer location 
proxy may not be helpful in this area. Accordingly, specific revenue 
sourcing rules will need to be developed linked to user location or 
activities of the user.   
 
78. A first example pertains to online advertisers that engage in targeted 
advertising. Consider the following triangular situation. Company F, 
which belongs to Group F, is a tax resident in Country R for its European 
operations and the users that maintain their profiles on the online 
platform live in Country U. Essentially, Company F gives its users the 
right to maintain their profiles on the platform and in return users 
contribute their personal data. Thereafter, the employees in Country R 
process that raw data and sell targeted advertising services to clients 
(Company B) in Country B. The service pertains to displaying Company 
Bs product / services to Country U users. The contract stipulates that 
Company B will pay advertisement fees to Company F based on the 
number of times a user clicks on the advertisement. In this situation, 
the payor of the advertisement fee is in Country B (customer location) 
and the users are in Country U (viewing location).  
 
79. Under the new nexus, the taxing right on Amount A would be allocated 
to Country U and not Country B. Thus, one possible approach to 
determine Country U relevant revenues is to ascertain whether the 
advertising is intended to be viewed by a Country U user. In the above 
example, all the revenue is linked to Country U as it is intended to be 
displayed only for Country U users111. The analysis becomes more 
complex when Company B pays Company F for promoting their product 
/ service in more than one user country (assume Country U1 and 
Country U2). The question then arises as to how do you determine 
revenues linked to different user countries? In this regard, as discussed 
 
111 European Commission, supra n. 23, Art. 5.     
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in the context of the UK DST, the revenue could be apportioned to each 
Country based on certain criteria which could range from the contractual 
requirements, the relative volume of users in each jurisdiction, the 
revenue per user in each jurisdiction, the relative engagement of users 
in each jurisdiction, the size and maturity of the platform in each 
jurisdiction, the average profitability or revenue performance in each 
jurisdiction and so on112. However, such criteria could complicate the 
analysis. Thus, to ease administration, a safe harbour could be 
developed and used based on the number of users. The safe harbour 
would assume that one user = one display113.  
 
80. The second example pertains to online marketplaces. Such 
marketplaces could connect users with each other for a wide range of 
underlying activities such as a service (accommodation service, a 
transportation service etc), sale of goods activity or match making 
(dating) and so on. At the outset, a general rule could be developed 
which could source the revenue to the location of the user114. In fact, 
the UK HMRC also follows a similar position115. On the other other hand, 
the general rule could be set aside for a specific rule depending on the 
underlying transaction. To illustrate, consider the following illustration.  
 
81. Company B, which belongs to Group B, is headquartered in Country B 
and it runs an online marketplace platform that connects 
accommodation seekers to accommodation providers. Accommodation 
providers (users) from Country C (owners of apartments) list their real 
estate property on the platform. At the same time, Mr A from Country A 
maintains his profile on the platform. Mr A books an apartment in 
Country C through the Country B platform. Mr A uses his credit card for 
 
112 UK: HM Treasury, Digital Services Tax Draft Guidance (2019), pp. 35-36.    
113 See European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the Corporate Taxation 
of a Significant Digital Presence and Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common 
System of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain 
Digital Services, 81 final/2, 2018/ (21 Mar. 2018), Annexure 12, pp. 150-153.   
114 European Commission, Impact Assessment, supra n. 113, pp. 153-155.       
115 UK: HM Treasury, Digital Services Tax Draft Guidance (2019), p. 37.    
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the transaction which amounts to USD 100. Company B retains a 
commission of USD 10 and passes on the balance to the accommodation 
provider in Country C. It should be noted that the accommodation 
provider is taxable on USD 90. The question now arises is which country 
is the location of sale for the new nexus and profit allocation rule from 
Group Bs perspective. Is it Country A or Country C or both?  
 
82. The EU Commission, in the context of DSTs, considers that taxing rights 
could be allocated to both ‘user’ locations116. On the other hand, the UK 
HMRC states that a special rule applies with respect to the property 
(land) in the UK even if the owner of the property is outside the UK and 
a non UK user utilizes that property117. In such a case, the revenue is 
sourced to the UK. Thus, we believe that further consideration should 
be given to transactions that involve the use of property (even moveable 
property such as cars) in the sense that the revenues associated to such 
transactions could be sourced only to the country where the property is 
situated or used (which by default, could be the consumption location).  
 
83. A common question in the aforementioned examples pertains to the 
definition of the term ‘user’. Once again, a reference could be made to 
the various DST proposals to determine the meaning of this term118. 
 
4.5. Collection of taxes by market countries   
 
 84. Another question arises with respect to how can market countries collect 
taxes for Amount A. One possible answer is to give the MNE the option 
to nominate a constituent entity (as discussed in the EU DST119) or a 
 
116 European Commission, Impact Assessment, supra n. 113, pp. 153-155.       
117 UK: HM Treasury, Digital Services Tax Draft Guidance (2019), p. 38.    
118 UK: HM Treasury, Digital Services Tax Draft Guidance (2019), pp. 31-33; European 
Commission, supra n. 23, Art. 2. 
119 European Commission, Impact Assessment, supra n. 113, p. 156. 
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responsible member120 as discussed in the UK DST. This entity will be 
liable with other entities of the MNE (till the extent they are there) in 
the market jurisdiction to remit taxes to the local government.  Where 
Amount A applies in the absence of a physical presence in the Market 
Country, another possibility would of course be for this country to 
impose a withholding tax. The problem with this latter approach 
however is that taxes would then be collected on a gross and not on a 
net basis. It is questionable whether such a policy would be consistent 
with the rationale pursued by the allocation of non-routine profits under 
Amount A.  Further, while applicable to dividends, interest and royalties 
under the OECD MC, this policy is switched off where such items are 
connected to a permanent establishment situated in the state of 
source121. Conceptually, therefore, it would seem inconsistent to switch 
to gross basis taxation under Amount A. 
4.6. Dispute prevention mechanisms    
 
85. Several disputes could arise within the context of Amount A. For 
example, the disputes could relate to scope, identification of MNE 
business Lines, the identification of the taxable person and the 
corresponding relief from double taxation that the relevant State of 
residence must provide to its resident person. Thus, detailed guidance 
(commentary) will need to be developed to minimize differences in 
interpretation. As a result, it would be appropriate to focus on obtaining 
consensus via multilateral competent authority agreements on areas 
that are prone for maximum litigation (also see section 6). In other 
words, the focus should be on dispute prevention122.    
  
4.7. Information exchange for Amount A  
 
 
120 UK: HM Treasury, Digital Services Tax Draft Guidance (2019), p. 52. 
121 Art. 10(4), 11(4) and 12(3) OECD MC 
122 V. Chand, Allocation of Taxing Rights, supra n. 10, section 6.5. 
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86. In order to implement the new method, the aforementioned information 
(for example, MNE business line profits or losses as well as location of 
sales) will need to be exchanged among tax administrations. Substantial 
work has already been done in relation to CBCR. Accordingly, one 
possibility would be to modify the current version of CBCR 
documentation in such a way that it would facilitate the implementation 
of the new taxing right. If this path is followed, then the automatic 
information exchange framework would need to be amended too.  
 
 
5. Profit Allocation: Amounts B  
 
87. Unlike Amount A, Amount B is intended to remain within the range of 
the arm’s length principle. With respect to Amount B and Amount C123, 
firstly, the question arises as to whether it applies to all businesses or 
whether it is applicable to consumer / user facing businesses? From a 
neutrality standpoint, we would find it prima facie difficult to justify the 
application of this Amount only to consumer / user businesses. This point 
would thus deserve further consideration.  
 
88. Second, Amount B should only be applicable to taxpayers (local PE or 
separate related entity) that mainly do marketing or distribution 
activities or a combination of them. The proposal should not apply, for 
example, to a licensed manufacturer (or a local entrepreneur such as a 
full-fledged manufacturer) of the MNE Group that buys raw materials, 
makes the products and markets / distributes / sells them. 
 
89. Third, the question arises as to whether this amount is a minimum profit 
allocation regime or a safe harbor which could be rebutted124 (as 
understood in the transfer pricing context).  
 
123 OECD, Public Consultation Document, supra n. 4, at paras. 62-65. 
124 For a discussion on safe harbors or presumptions, see OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017, para. 4.95 - 
4.133; A. Turina, Back To Grass Roots: The Arm's Length Standard, Comparability 
and Transparency: Some Perspectives From The Emerging World, 10 World Tax J. 2, 
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90. Although discussed in a slightly different context, a minimum profit 
allocation regime had already been advocated by India in the context of 
the SEP proposal. Essentially, the Central Board of Direct Taxes had 
proposed that the taxable base in India for a non-residents SEP should, 
at a minimum, be equal to two percent of Indian revenues even if the 
non-resident is making losses125. In our opinion, such an approach would 
be very difficult to reconcile with the ‘principles of economic capacity 
and net basis taxation’126, in particular, the ability to pay principle. 
Moreover, we fail to see the justification for such an approach from a 
proportionality standpoint. Consequently, we do not favor the 
application of a minimum profit allocation regime for marketing / 
distribution / sales activities.  
 
91. On the other hand, we agree that the existing transfer pricing system, 
in general, could trigger several disputes among taxpayers and tax 
administrations127. Thus, in order to achieve certainty, we agree with 
certain commentators who argue that countries, in general, should 
‘return to the issue of transfer pricing safe harbours’128. These safe 
harbors, as a start, could be applied to low risk marketing / distribution 
functions129 (this is already contemplated in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines)130.  
 
 
pp. 332-336 (2018); S. Picciotto, Problems of Transfer Pricing and Possibilities for 
Simplification, ICTD Working Paper 86, p. 29 (Box 4) (Nov. 2018). 
125 Central Board of Direct Taxes, supra n. 23, paras. 161-163. 
126 See OECD, Corporate Loss Utilisation, supra n. 97.  See also under Swiss law Danon 
R, Com. ad Art. 57-58 N 177 et seq.. in: Noël Y/Aubry-Girardin F. (eds.) Impôt 
fédéral direct: Commentaire de la loi sur l'impôt fédéral direct, 2017. 
127 See J. Andrus & P. Oosterhuis, Transfer Pricing After BEPS: Where Are We and Where 
Should We Be Going, 95 Taxes The Tax Magazine 89, p. 104 (March 2017). Also, see 
V. Chand, Achieving Certainty in an Uncertain Profit Allocation Environment 
(Editorial), 47 (12) Intertax, 2019. 
128 R. Collier & J. Andrus, Transfer Pricing and the Arm’s Length Principle (Oxford 
University Press, 2017), at 269-270.  
129 Thereafter, they could be broadened to other areas such as contract research and 
development, low risk procurement operations and contract and toll manufacturing.   
130 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations 2017, pp. 459-463.   
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92. In fact, such an approach is already followed by the tax administration 
in Israel131. Their guidance states that a 3%-4% (return on sales)  
profitability margin applies for distributions activities and a 10%-12% 
(return on costs) margin for marketing activities. Moreover, their 
guidance contains a detailed discussion on low risk distribution and 
marketing activities. Thus, references could be made to their guidance 
to derive a definition of distribution / marketing activities that could be 
within the scope of this proposal. It should be noted that these activities 
should not amount to i) ‘unique and valuable contributions’, especially, 
activites that create valuable local intangibles; ii) be classified as ‘highly 
integrated’ operations, or iii) lead to ‘shared assumption of economically 
significant risks’ or ‘separate assumption of closely related risks’132. If 
they do, then the activities need to be analysed under Amount C.  
 
93. While in some situations MNEs could distinguish between distribution 
and marketing activities, we do acknowledge that, in many situations, 
such activities could be intertwined with each other.133 For instance, see 
the various decisions rendered by Indian Courts on Advertising, 
Marketing and Sales promotion expenses134.   
 
94. Also, contrary to the approach followed in Israel, we are of the opinion 
that the different margins need to be proposed for different businesses. 
 
131 For more details, see Circular 11/2018, available at 
https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/10/tnf-israel-11-oct9-
2018.pdf  (unofficial translation) and Circular 12/2018, available at 
https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/10/tnf-israel-12-oct9-
2018.pdf (unofficial translation). Also see, Israel’s OECD, Transfer Pricing Country 
Profile, Updated May 2019, question 24, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/transfer-pricing-country-profile-
israel.pdf . 
132 OECD, Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional Profit Split Method, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 4 Jun. 2018). Also see EU 
Commission - EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (EUJTPF), The Application of the Profit 
Split Method within the EU, Doc JTPF/002/2019 (March, 2019).   
133 For instance, see the watch example. See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017, Annex To Chapter VI: 
Examples on Intangibles, Example 8, pp. 570-572.   
134 See  Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. v. Addl. CIT TPO [2010]; LG Electronics India (P.) Ltd. 
v. Asstt. CIT [2013]; Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications India (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 
[2015] 3; Bausch & Lomb Eyecare India (P.) Ltd. V. Addl. CIT [2016]; CIT-LTU v. 
Whirlpool of India Ltd. [2016].   
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In our experience, the margins applied for low risk distribution / 
marketing activities differ from industry to industry. Thus, a range of 
margins will need to be proposed.    
 
6. Profit Allocation: Amounts C  
 
95. Once again, at the outset, we would like to submit that this amount 
should only be applicable to taxpayers (local PE or separate related 
entity) that mainly do valuable marketing or distribution activities or a 
combination of them. For example, this Amount could apply to Full 
Fledged Distributors (FFD). Once again, one could refer to the guidance 
provided by the tax administration in Israel to understand the concept 
of a FFD135. Moreover, a reference could be made to the various ‘watch’ 
examples found in the transfer pricing guidelines136. As stated 
previously, we submit that the Amount should not apply, for example, 
to a licensed manufacturer (or a local entrepreneur such as a full-fledged 
manufacturer). 
 
96. In many situations, local FFDs could also be booking residual profits 
especially, a part of profits linked to marketing intangibles. Thus, there 
could be an overlap between Amount C and Amount, A which also seeks 
to reallocate a part of the residual profits to the market countries. 
Consider the following example.  
 
97. Co G, a tax resident of Country G (EU State), is the parent entity of an 
MNE Group that is active in several countries. Co G has developed its 
products in Country G and sells in that market and in other markets. In 
Country Y, the products are sold through a related distributor (FFD), Co 
Y, which reports an arm’s length operating margin of 10% on sales (this 
 
135 For more details, see Circular 11/2018, available at 
https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/10/tnf-israel-11-oct9-
2018.pdf  (unofficial translation)  
136 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations 2017, Annex To Chapter VI: Examples on Intangibles, Examples 9-
10, pp. 572-576.   
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amount could be based on a comparability study or could have been 
agreed in an Advance Pricing Agreement). Financial information: The 
overall consolidated operating revenue of the Group is USD 1,000, and 
the overall EBT is USD 400. The sales to end customers in Country Y 
amount to USD 300.  
 
98. Amount A: In order to calculate this amount, the overall profit margin 
of the Group is 40%. The routine profit margin deemed to be is 10%. 
Accordingly, the residual profit margin is 30%. One fourth of that margin 
is attributable to marketing intangibles that are linked to the Market 
Countries. This would lead to the conclusion that the profit attributable 
to marketing intangibles linked to the Market Countries is 7.5% of the 
overall revenues, which amounts to USD 75 (USD 1,000*7.5%). 
Country Y will be allocated USD 22.5 (75*300/1000 = 22.5) of that profit 
under Amount A.  
 
99. Amount C: Co Y (FFD) is reporting an arm’s length margin of 10% on 
local sales. This amounts to USD (300*10/100 = 30). 
 
100. To a certain extent there is an overlap between Amount A and Amount 
C. Thus, in order to reduce this overlap, one possibility is to reduce the 
entire Amount C from Amount A liability. This would thus lead to the 
conclusion that the MNE Group does not pay any taxes in the market 
country under Amount A.  
 
101. Another option, which is more nuanced, is to reduce from Amount A, an 
amount that is linked to non routine margins. Assume that routine 
remuneration for low risk distribution / marketing functions in Country 
Y amount to 4% on sales (Amount B). Thus, the amount that will be 
reduced from Amount A will be linked to the non routine margin, that is, 
6% on Country Y sales which amounts to USD 18 (300*6/100=18). Thus 
the taxable amount under Amount A in Country Y amounts to USD 22.5-
18 = USD 4.5. 
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102. Clearly, several disputes could arise in relation to Amount A, Amount B 
and Amount C. With respect to Amount A, we strongly believe that the 
OECD Secretariat should primarily focus on dispute prevention 
mechanisms. For instance, multilateral competent authority 
arrangements should be developed which would reflect a common 
understanding of several issues in the proposal. Similarly, with respect 
to Amount C, the focus should be on enhancing the existing dispute 
prevention framework such as by encouraging the use of multilateral 
APAs137 or enhancing the participation of countries in the ICAP 
project138.  
 
7. Implementation: Amount A, B and C  
 
103. Several alternatives could be contemplated to implement the solutions 
on a multilateral basis. With respect to the MNE Group approach and 
Amount A, one possibility is to modify the existing Multilateral 
Instrument (MLI). However, the MLI only modifies existing tax 
treaties139. Thus, this approach may not be suitable to implement the 
Amount A approach. Another possibility is to develop a new standalone 
Multilateral Convention dealing with substantive matters (scope, nexus, 
profit (loss) allocation, relief and so on). We believe that this approach 
should be adopted and consideration should be given to a new 
Multilateral Convention. With respect to rules that will deal with Amount 
B, we forsee a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding that could be 
attached to the new multilateral convention.  
  
 
137 For a discussion on safe harbors or presumptions, see OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017, para. 4.141.  
138 See OECD, International Compliance Assurance Programme Pilot Handbook, OECD 
publishing, Paris 2018; OECD, International Compliance Assurance Programme Pilot 
Handbook 2.0, OECD Publishing, Paris 2019. 
139   See thereupon Danon R/Salomé H, The BEPS Multilateral Instrument: General 
overview and focus on treaty abuse, IFF Forum für Steuerrecht 2017, p. 197 et seq.  
 
 44 
 
Bibliography  
 
International Organisations Guidance  
 
EU Commission - EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (EUJTPF), The Application 
of the Profit Split Method within the EU, Doc JTPF/002/2019, 2019.   
 
European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate 
taxation of a significant digital presence & Proposal for a Council Directive on 
the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the 
provision of certain digital services, SWD/2018/082 final - 2018/072 (CNS), 
2018. 
 
European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common 
System of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of 
Certain Digital Services, COM/2018/0148 final - 2018/0073(CNS), 2018. 
 
European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules 
relating to the Corporate Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, 
COM/2018/0147 final - 2018/072(CNS), 2018.  
 
European Commission: Taxation Papers, Formulary Apportionment and Group 
Taxation In the European Union: Insights From the United States and Canada, 
Woking Paper No 8 / 2005. 
 
OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy – 
Public Consultation Document, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project, OECD Publishing, Paris 2019.   
 
OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 - 2015 
Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD 
Publishing, Paris 2015. 
 
OECD, Corporate Loss Utilisation through Aggressive Tax Planning, OECD 
Publishing, Paris 2011.    
 
OECD, Electronic Commerce: Taxation Framework Conditions, Report by the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD Publishing, Paris 1998. 
 
OECD, International Compliance Assurance Programme Pilot Handbook, 
OECD publishing, Paris 2018. 
 
 45 
OECD, International Compliance Assurance Programme Pilot Handbook 2.0, 
OECD Publishing, Paris 2019. 
 
OECD, International VAT/GST Guidelines, OECD Publishing, Paris 2017. 
 
OECD/G20, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments, Action 4: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris 2015. 
 
OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2017 (Full Version), 
OECD Publishing, Paris 2017. 
 
OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris 2017. 
 
OECD, Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments 2010, 
OECD Publishing, Paris 2010. 
 
OECD, Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional Profit Split 
Method, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 
Paris 2018.  
 
OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris 
2019.  
 
OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: 
Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project, OECD Publishing, Paris 2018. 
 
OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, 
Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project, OECD Publishing, Paris 2015. 
 
UN, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed 
and Developing Countries, UN, New York 2017. 
 
UN, United Nations Handbook on Selected Issues for the Taxation of the 
Extractive Industries by Developing States, UN, New York 2019.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
National Law Guidance 
 
Austria: Der Nationalrat, Digitalsteuergesetz 2020 (132/ME), 2019. 
 
France: Gouvernement de la République française, LOI n° 2019-759 du 24 
juillet 2019 portant création d'une taxe sur les services numériques et 
modification de la trajectoire de baisse de l'impôt sur les sociétés, 2019.   
 
India: Central Board of Direct Taxes, Income department – Government of 
India, Proposal for Amendment of Rules for Profit Attribution to Permanent 
Establishment (CBDT), 2019. 
 
Italy: Governo italiano, Bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l’anno finanziario 
2019 e bilancio pluriennale per il triennio 2019-2021, 2019.     
 
New Zealand: New Zealand Government, Options for Taxing the Digital 
Economy – a Government Discussion Document, 2019.      
 
Spain: Gobierno de España, Proyecto de Ley del Impuesto sobre 
Determinados Servicios Digitales, 2019.  
 
United Kingdom: HM Treasury, Corporate tax and the Digital Economy: 
Position Paper Update, 2018. 
 
United Kingdom: HM Revenue & Customs, Draft Legislation on the New Digital 
Services Tax, 2019. 
 
United States: Multistate Tax Commission (MTC), Model General Allocation & 
Apportionment Regulations With Amendments Submitted for Adoption by the 
Commission February 24, 2017. 
 
Scholarly Books & Articles (Non-exhaustive List) 
 
J. Andrus & P. Oosterhuis, Transfer Pricing After BEPS: Where Are We and 
Where Should We Be Going, 95 Taxes The Tax Magazine, p. 89, 2017.  
 
B. Arnold, Threshold Requirements for Taxing Business Profits under Tax 
Treaties, 57 Bull. Int’l Tax’n 10, p. 476, 2003. 
 
A. Auerbach, M. Devereux, M. Keen & J. Vella, Destination-Based Cash Flow 
Taxation, Saïd Business School Working Paper 2017/09, 2017. 
 
R. Avi-Yonah, & O. Halabi, A Model Treaty for the Age of BEPS, Law & 
Economics Working Papers, Paper 103, p. 15, 2014. 
 
 47 
R. Avi-Yonah, Designing a 21st century Taxing Threshold: Some International 
implications of South Dakota vs. Wayfair, Public law and Legal Theory 
research paper no. 611, 2018.   
 
R. Avi Yonah, K. Clausing & M. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax 
Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Profit Split, Michigan Law Working 
Paper, 2008. 
 
A.J. Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in the Taxation of Electronic 
Commerce Business Profits, 74 Tulane Law Review, p. 133, 1999.  
 
R. Collier & J. Andrus, Transfer Pricing and the Arm’s Length Principle, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2017. 
 
V. Chand, Achieving Certainty in an Uncertain Profit Allocation Environment 
(Editorial), 47 (12) Intertax, 2019 (forthcoming) 
 
V. Chand, Allocation of taxing rights in the Digitalized Economy: Assessment 
of potential policy solutions and recommendation for a Simplified Profit Split 
Method, 47 (12) Intertax, 2019 (forthcoming) 
 
R. Danon, Can Tax Treaty Policy Save Us? The Case of the Digital Economy, 
in Arnold B (ed), Tax Treaties After the BEPS Project: A Tribute to Jacques 
Sasseville, Canadian Tax Foundation, 2018, p. 75 et seq 
 
R. Danon, Com. ad Art. 57-58 in: Noël Y/Aubry-Girardin F. (ed.) Impôt fédéral 
direct: Commentaire de la loi sur l'impôt fédéral direct, 2017 
 
R. Danon & H. Salomé, The BEPS Multilateral Instrument: General overview 
and focus on treaty abuse, IFF Forum für Steuerrecht 2017, p. 197 et seq 
 
R. Danon & V. Chand, Public Comments on Addressing the Tax Challenges of 
the Digitalisation of the Economy – Public Consultation Document, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2019, available on 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/hou6dvuckmahoft/OECD-Comments-Received-
Digital-March-2019.zip?dl=0  
 
M. Devereux & R. de la Feria, Designing and Implementing a Destination 
Based Corporate Tax, Oxford University Center for Business Taxation, WP 
14/07, 2014. 
 
M. Devereux, A. Auerbach, M. Keen, P. Oosterhuis, W. Schön & J. Vella, 
Residual Profit Allocation by Income, Saïd Business School Working Paper 
19/01, 2019.    
 
 48 
J.C Fleming, RJ. Peroni & S. Shay, Formulary Apportionment in the US 
International Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 
2015.  
 
I. Grinberg, Stabilizing “Pillar One”: Corporate Profit Reallocation in an 
Uncertain Environment, Georgetown University Working Paper, 2019. 
 
W. Hellerstein, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to the OECD’s International VAT/GST 
Guidelines, 18 FLA. Tax Rev., p. 589, 2016. 
 
M.A. Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in International Taxation, 32 Yale J. on 
Regulation, p. 311, 2015.  
 
L. Lokken, The Sources of Income From International Uses and Dispositions 
of Intellectual Property, 36 Tax Law Rev., p. 233, 1981.  
 
G. Maisto, The history of article 8 of the OECD model treaty on taxation of 
shipping and air transport, Intertax 31.6, p. 232, 2003. 
 
P. Oosterhuis & A. Parsons, Destination Based Income Taxation: Neither 
Principled Nor Practical?, 71 Tax Law Rev., p. 515, 2018. 
 
S. Picciotto, Problems of Transfer Pricing and Possibilities for Simplification, 
ICTD Working Paper 86, 2018. 
 
W. Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy, 
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Working paper 2017-11, 
22 (2018) 
 
W. Schön, One Answer to Why and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy, Max 
Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Working paper 2010-10, 3-
12 (2019) 
 
L. Spinosa & V. Chand, A Long-Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business 
Models: Should the Permanent Establishment Definition be Modified to resolve 
the Issue or Should the Focus be on a Shared Taxing Rights Mechanism?, 46 
(6/7) Intertax, p. 476, 2018. 
 
A. Turina, Back To Grass Roots: The Arm's Length Standard, Comparability 
and Transparency - Some Perspectives From The Emerging World, 10 World 
Tax J. 2, p. 295, 2018.  
 
R. Vann, Reflections on Business Profits and the Arm’s-Length Principle, in 
The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties, B. J. Arnold, J. Sasseville 
& E. M. Zolt eds, Canadian Tax Foundation, p. 133, 2003. 
 
 49 
R. Vann, Taxing International Business Income: Hard Boiled Wonderland and 
the End of the World, 2 WTJ 3, Journals IBFD, p. 291, 2010.  
 
 
********* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
